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THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN PARAGUAY TWO YEARS AFTER THE COUP
Introduction
The political transition from dictatorship to democracy,
which was initiated by the military coup led by General Andres
Rodriguez on 3 February 1989, continued through 1990 and 1991.
Currently, four of the five goals stated by General Rodriguez for
overthrowing the government of General Alfredo Stroessner are
being implemented. These goals were stated in order to contrast
the new regime with the personalistic and archaic dictatorship
Stroessner had created and dominated for thirty-four years. The
dignity and honor of the Armed Forces are currently not in
question, and the military are gradually decreasing their role in
politics. Not only has democracy been initiated, but many
important processes and reforms have been initiated whereby it
may feasibly continue to consolidation. While there are still
some abuses of human rights, generally the record is much
improved. And relations with the Catholic Church are generally
good, though the Church continues to criticize the government for
the corruption which many consider a defining characteristic of
the Paraguayan political system.
The only goal which is clearly not being achieved is the
"...total and complete unification of the Colorado Party in
government..." 2 Indeed, the Asociacion Republicana Nacional ,
Partido Colorado is, if anything, more factionalized than ever,
and obviously incapable of providing a base for governing. Since
the Colorado Party was the civilian basis of support for the
Stroessner regime, and holds a two-thirds majority in the
Congress, its virtual atomization holds important implications
for the effectiveness of the government. The positive side of
its atomization has been to open space for other political
parties and movements to assume increasingly important roles in
Paraguay. The most dramatic evidence of this was the election
of Dr. Carlos Filizzola as Mayor of Asuncion on 26 May 1991. Not
only was he the first elected mayor in the history of Paraguay,
but also the first person in contemporary history to defeat the
Colorado Party in an important election.
In addition to changes in the political system, Paraguay is
also changing in other areas. Since the coup Paraguay is
integrating into regional and international economic and
political structures and has positive and much closer relations
with the United States. The economy is in better condition than
most of the neighboring countries, but reforms in taxing and
denationalization have not been implemented - in large part due
to the splits in the Colorado Party and aggravated by corruption.
Reforms in social areas including health, education, and justice
remain to be defined. Thus the transition continues far better
than most observers anticipated after the coup, but serious
political and social obstacles remain. 3
The Rodriguez Government and the Colorado Party
In preparation for the general elections on 1 May 1989 the
Traditionalist sector of the Colorado Party established an
agreement in March with all dissident factions of the party but
for the small clique, militantes , or militants, who were removed
in the coup with General Stroessner. In the relatively honest
and free elections General Rodriguez won the presidency with 74%
of the vote, and the Colorado Party took the Congress with 70%.
Even if the Colorado Party had not won the 70%, it would have
received two-thirds of the seats in the bicameral Congress in
accord with the 1981 electoral law which gives two-third to the
party with a plurality.
The candidate of the Partido Liberal Radical Autentico
(authentic radical liberal party) , Domingo Laino, won 20% of the
vote and his party 19%. The results for the other parties were
negligible.
On election day the president stated that all reforms for a
full transition to democracy would be made before the next
elections in 1993. (Rodriguez is completing the deposed
Stroessner' s mandate which began in 1988.) The electoral law
would be revised and the voting registration rolls updated. And,
President Rodriguez stated he would not run for a second term.
The reforms are being implemented, but his declaration not to
seek a second term resulted in the fragmentation of the Colorado
Party as individuals jockey for positions to achieve the
presidency.
The electoral law was revised in January 1990 and entered
into effect in March. The executive proposed the revision, but
it was opposed by a large segment of the traditionalist sector in
the Congress. The Congress recessed in December and the members
went on vacation before completing their work on the law. The
president recalled the Congress in an extraordinary session, and
the law was changed. In addition to a number of articles which
tend to separate the state from the party, it provides for a new
registry of voters, direct elections for mayors for the first
time ever, direct election of party leaders, proportional
representation in Congress, electoral tribunals, independent and
coalition candidates and officers, media time, and a system of
electoral justices. Between May and December 1990 the electoral
tribunal re-registered 1.4 million voters and established a more
reliable voter registry. The political parties changed their
statutes in accord with the national law, and are now obliged to
hold primary elections prior to general elections (municipal,
constituent assembly, congressional, and the presidential).
The Colorados held their primary elections for the municipal
elections in April 1991. Rather than achieving unity, however,
they split even further. By the time the Colorado Party held its
convention on 14 July 1991, the divisions were extremely complex.
It should be noted that by September 1990 the unity pact of
March 1989 had broken down and the Colorados were fighting each
other. The factionalization has continued, resulting in a myriad
of groups associated with individual politicians. It probably
requires a Hollywood gossip columnist to do justice to defining
the divisions, but by late-1991, according to ABC Color , the
political terrain of the Party was roughly the following: 1. The
traditionalists divided into five factions: autonomos led by ex-
Foreign Minister Luis Maria Argana; renovadores led by Minister
of Education and religion Angel Roberto Seifart; the democraticos
or Tradem, led by Bias N. Riquelme; the generacion intermedia led
by P. Da Silva and J.C. Frutos; and the movimento de unidad led
by Minister of Interior Machuca Vargas. These are also termed
the x old guard'. 2. The Frente Democratico composed of MOPOCO
(Movimiento Popular Colorado) led by Waldino R. Lovera,
Movimiento Historico y Popular led by Mendez Vail, and
Coloradoismo Democratico led by G. Casabianaca. 3. The Nueva
Generacion led by Eduardo Venialgo; 4. the Accion Revolucionaria
Democratica , ARDE; and 5. the Movimiento Nacional Republicano
(militantes) , led by Martin Chiola and Cameron Mon.
President Rodriguez publicly and frequently criticized the
Colorados for not achieving unity. This is significant as he was
the party's candidate for the presidency on 1 May 1989, is the
honorary head of the party, and his government, at least
initially, included exclusively members of the party. It must be
remembered that Paraguay was exceptional for a traditional Latin
American dictatorship in that the Colorado Party was central to
Stroessner's ability to rule for so long and to maintain
stability. Continuing down to the present, the party is country-
wide, being based in each locality in a seccional , of which
there are 246 nation-wide, and all public employees from nurses
and teachers to army generals, have previously been obliged to
belong. Even after the re-registration, and at the time of the
internal elections for the constituent elections in September
1991, according to the newspapers the party had 947,012 members.
While it provided a central pillar of the Stroessner regime, in
its factionalized condition it has proven to be an obstacle to
governing. The president was not able to draw on Colorado Party
support in his efforts to privatize and achieve a standby loan
agreement with the International Monetary Fund. It is not
leading, and has played a small or negative role in the
democratic consolidation that is currently underway. Formally at
least, public employees no longer must belong to the party, and
cadets are no longer obliged to join in the military academy.
The day before the 14 July 1991 party convention, President
Rodriguez criticized the Colorados and very strongly expressed
his distress at the factionalization. In referring to the five
goals in the 3 February 1989 proclamation, "We still have not
achieved granite unity within the ANR. I have requested and
desire that unity and I am distressed because we have not yet
achieved it." He also criticized the party in his speech on the
opening of the Congress on 1 April 1991. "Internal stability
would have been less difficult had the political parties used
their abilities to better manage their internal conflicts." In
his statement at that time on the four main protagonists- "the
people, the government, the Armed Forces, and the political
organizations," he does not mention the Colorado Party by name. 6
High-ranking military officers have also criticized the lack of
unity in the party. They perceive the divisions as creating a
political vacuum, thereby jeopardizing the stability of the
political transition which should have been provided by the
Colorado Party.
In order to govern, the president has relied less on the
Colorado Party and more on independents with expertise, friends,
and associates. Whereas the party and government were fused
under Stroessner, they are now increasingly separate. In the
process the government is less Colorado and considerably younger.
As early as November 1989 Rodriguez replaced the Public Health
and Social Welfare Minister, an old Colorado party hack, with a
non-political expert, Dr. Maria Cinthia Prieto Conti. She was
the first woman in history to hold a cabinet position. In August
1990 he replaced the highly political and deeply entrenched,
Foreign Minister, Luis Maria Argana, with the more professional,
Dr. Alexis Frutos Vaesken. The new Foreign Minister reorganized
the ministry, fired many party loyalists without expertise, and
established a Council of Advisors composed of two former foreign
ministers, opposition politicians, and the Director of the
Presidency. Fairly non-political businessmen have been nominated
as ambassadors. A recognized agronomist, Basilio Nikiphoroff,
became Director of the Agrarian Reform Institute and Ubaldo
Scavone became Minister of Industry and Commerce.
The president has also sought cooperation with other
political parties, and they have reciprocated. In contrast to
the old regime, there is much dialogue between President
Rodrigues and the main political parties. 7 These include (a) the
Partido Liberal Radical Autentico (authentic radical liberal
party) in which Juan Manuel Benitez Florentin is president, but
Domingo Laino is the most prominent figure; (b) the Partido
Revolucionario Febrerista (febreristas) , in which Euclides
Acevedo is the president; and (c) the Partido Democrata Cristiano
(Christian democratic party) , where the president is Angel Jose
Burro. Members of these parties have cooperated with the
government in congress and travelling abroad with the president,
foreign minister, and other delegations in order to promote a new
and more positive image of Paraguay.
Since the elections on 1 May 1989 and the revision of the
electoral law and registration in 1990, two major plateaus are
apparent in the transition process. After being delayed twice,
direct elections were held for the first time ever on 26 May 1991
for mayors and municipal governments. Also for the first time
ever, candidates were not required to be members of political
parties. The Colorado Party was split, and the PLRA was also
divided.
These divisions, in the context of changed rules of the
game, allowed for the emergence of a completely new phenomenon in
Paraguay: an anti-Colorado mayor in Asuncion, Dr. Carlos
Filizzola. Filizzola was young (31) , had long been an opponent
of the old regime and the Colorado Party, and was supported by
labor and other groups critical of the government in a movement
known as the Asuncion para Todos (Asuncion for All) . Filizzola
won with 34% of the vote with strong support from youth, the
labor groups in the Central Unitaria de Trabaiadores (united
labor central, CUT), of which he was Deputy Secretary General,
and the util (calculated) vote. The Colorado candidate received
27% of the vote, followed by the PLRA 20%, and the PRF 10%.
Turnout was 83% of the registered voters. Filizzola' s movement
also won eight of the twenty-four city council seats, followed by
the Colorados (seven) , PLRA (six) , PRF (two) , and another
independent. The elections were very poorly administered, but
judged to be generally fair by international observers. The
government invited the Organization of American States to monitor
the elections. They were such an administrative mess that
elections were held in thirty-one municipalities a month later.
Nationwide the Colorados won in 145 of the municipalities and the
PLRA in 30, including the important suburb of Asuncion (Fernando
de la Mora)
.
8 In the delayed elections the Colorados won in 60%
and the PLRA increased its representation, including in the
second most important city, San Lorenzo. 9 Filizzola took office
in late June and national and foreign dignitaries attended to
show support for the democratic transition.
The municipal elections demonstrated that the Colorado Party
was not invincible. Overall, its vote for the municipal
elections was 43% (vs. 70% in the congressional elections in
1989) , and the PLRA increased its share to 33% (vs. 19% in 1989)
.
The Armed Forces publicly recognized the results, and President
Rodriguez invited Filizzola to the presidential palace on 28 May,
and both the president and mayor demonstrated their interest in
cooperation. 10 The results highlighted once again the problems
of factionalism for the Colorado Party and raised the question of
candidacies for the 1993 elections. It was in this context that
some Colorado politicians suggested that they would like
President Rodriguez as their candidate. He has continued to
indicate his lack of interest in running in 1993. Whether an
incumbent can run will depend on the new constitution.
On 12 June the National Assembly (the Congress, Council of
State, and representatives from economic sectors - 127 people)
voted virtually unanimously for a complete reform of Stroessner's
dictated 1967 constitution. Since the constitution was the legal
basis of his dictatorship, its reform is unanimously perceived as
necessary to consolidate the democratic transition. President
Rodriguez stated very strongly his belief that the constitution
required a thorough reform. Elections for the constituent
assembly will be held in early December 1991. On 14 June, the
day after after the National Assembly voted, the president called
on the leaders of the main Colorado factions to put aside their
differences. The Colorado Party held its elections on 29
September with four different factions competing. The
traditionalists have continued predominant.
10
Politically, therefore, Paraguay has gone far in its
democratic transition since the 1989 coup. The electoral law has
been revised, free if disorganized municipal elections have been
held in which the Colorados lost badly, and the constitution will
be replaced. The Colorados have not been up to the task of
governing, however, and the tendency towards factionalization
seems endemic to Paraguayan political life. With the success of
an independent in being elected mayor of Asuncion, the political
scene may well shift substantially before the general elections
in 1993. President Rodriguez has made efforts to cooperate with
the opposition, and while the congress has not been particularly
effective, he has recognized its decisions. For example, in mid-
September 1991 the congress overrode his vetos on two laws. One
was to expropriate a very large tract of land owned by a friend
of the president and the other was to create a controller general
independent of the executive. The effects of these positive and
negative aspects of the changing government of Paraguay will be
obvious in all other areas to be discussed in the sections to
follow.
11





Education and Religious Affairs
Agriculture
Public Works and Communications
Defense




General Orlando Machucu Vargas
Dr. Alexis Frutos Vaesken
Dr. Juan Jose Diaz Perez
Dr. Angel Roberto Seifart
Eng. Raul Venancio Torres
Gen. Porfirio Pereira Diaz
Gen. Angel S. Souto
Dr. Maria Cinthia Prieto Conti
Dr. Hugo Estigarribia Elizeche
Dr. Ubaldo Scavone
The Armed Forces
The military continue to be supportive of the political
transition, with frequent statements by high-ranking officers.
While criticizing the Colorado Party, and in contrast to the
Stroesser era, officers have been in contact with the opposition
parties. Despite the statements and contacts, however, the
overall tendency is towards some higher degree of
professionalization of the Armed Forces.
Under Stroessner there was no chief of staff for the army.
The army, with approximately 13,000 men (vs. navy with 3,500 and
air force with 1,500) is clearly the dominant service.
12
Stroessner wanted no intermediary between him and the commanders
so all would have to depend on him personally. Currently some
eight separate commands report to the president, as commander in
chief of the Armed Forces. There is now under discussion in the
congress a bill to create a chief of staff of the army, and in
the future only the three service chiefs would report to the
president. This is all the more significant since it is possible
that a civilian will be elected president in 1993.
The Paraguayan military have traditionally received much
less from the government budget than they require to operate.
Means are, however, open to the Armed Forces and to individual
officers to generate income through a whole variety of activities
which range from the completely legal to gradations of
illegality. It is significant that President Rodriguez removed
two generals in July 1990 who were thought to be involved in drug
trafficking. In addition to very close links with the
Brazilian military, the Paraguayan Armed Forces are increasingly
involved with the United States. In this latter case, however,
the greatest emphasis is currently in drug interdiction. While
there is no U.S. security assistance, and little International
Military Eduation and Training support, there is support for
various drug interdiction activities.
13
Social Groups and Movements
In the much more open environment initiated with the coup in
1989, social groups and movements have assumed increasing
importance. One that has not is the Catholic Church. By the end
of the Stroessner dictatorship, the Church was the single most
important opponent of the regime, active and outspoken in
condemnation of the regime's abuses of human rights and neglect
of the plight of the lower class. With the political opening and
emergence of other actors, its relative importance has
diminished. It remains, however, active in the socio-political
milieu with statements and documents that focus particularly on
the situation of the peasants. It is generally thought that the
Church is behind much of the organizing in the rural areas.
President Rodriguez, unlike his predecessor, attempts to get
along well with the Church, and publicly practices the religion.
Church-state relations are good, but for criticism of the
government to halt corruption. With the elections to a
constituent assembly on 1 December 1991, the Church will take a
very active role, just as it did in Brazil in the mid-to late-
1980's.
The Stroessner regime was suspended by the United States
from benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences due to
its unwillingness to allow labor to organize. The sanction was
lifted in February 1991 as the situation for organized labor had
improved, and hundreds of unions recognized. A new labor code,
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however, has yet to be enacted. The government, drawing on some
sectors of business and labor, presented one in November 1990.
Before then the CUT presented its own and did not participate in
the discussions with the government regarding its version. The
Congress has yet to enact a new labor law and the discussion has
largely focused on the rights of government workers to organize.
The CUT version is also supported by the small Central Nacional
de Trabaiadores , national workers central (CNT) . In addition to
the CUT and the CNT, there remains the Confederacion Paraquaya de
Trabaiadores , Paraguayan workers confederation (CPT) which was
the official labor organization in the old regime and is widely
considered an ineffective organization. The CUT is the most
powerful and most radical organization, is critical of the
government, and pushes for urban and rural labor interests most
forcefully. In terms of activity, it is followed by the CNT and
then the CPT. According to Roberto Luis Cespedes Ruffinelli, in
1990 the CUT had 101 affiliated unions, the CNT 53, and CPT
15,630 affiliates. The latter figure is due in large part to its
"official" status under the old regime. The CUT is not
affiliated internationally but has contacts with the ICFTU
(International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) and WFTU
(World Federation of Trade Unions) . It receives some support
from the AIFLD (American Institute of Free Labor Development)
which is supported by the AFL and CIO.
After a thirty-five year absence, Paraguay attended a
conference of the International Labor Organization in Geneva in
15
1991. Minister of Labor Estigarribia led the delegation which
included a CNT member as the labor representative and members of
the CUT and CPT as labor technical advisors. The CUT also
includes at least two peasants movements. They are the
Movimiento Campesino Paraquava (movement of Paraguayan peasants,
MCP) and Coordinadora Nacional de Productores Aqricolas (national
coordination of agricultural producers, CONAPA) . In this complex
and dynamic area of rural organizing, however, affiliation and
ideological orientation remains unclear. 1
While there is a certain amount of tension and violence
involving urban labor, undoubtedly the greatest problems concern
the rural areas. Since the coup it has been reported that
291,000 acres have been redistributed to approximately 20,000
peasant families in some thirty-four colonies. There are,
however, at least 350,000 landless peasants remaining. As there
is a high degree of expectation arising from the change of
government, and frustration over the corruption and inefficiency
in the redistribution process, violence has been frequent.
In August 1990, President Rodriguez ordered the military not
to intervene in land issues as it was losing prestige over direct
involvement in this violence-prone and very complex issue.
Rather, a special organization within the police (the Fuerzas de
Qperaciones Policiales Especiales
. FOPE) are now tasked to
handle evictions. They are supposed to use warrants and have
prior consent from the Agrarian Reform Institute, IBR. It seems
obvious that the fact and style of evictions depends on who has
16
title to the land.
In this area, as all others, there is great difficulty
implementing policy due to the politics of the administering
organization. The agronomist, Nikhiporoff, was forced to resign
in September 1991 due to internal problems in the IBR. It should
be noted his opponents in the IBR Council were also forced out.
Violence in the land situation has been relatively frequent with
conflicts between peasants, owners, and often the police. It
should be noted, however, that the base of the Colorado Party
remains in the rural areas among the peasants.
In the overall relationship of government and society there
has been a tremendous change since the coup. Human rights abuses
are greatly reduced, there is little repression, no political
prisoners, and official censorship is minimal. 6 All is not as
encouraging as it might be, however, due to pervasive corruption,
political infighting among the Colorados, and a very long
tradition of authoritarian rule. Indeed, Paraguay has virtually
no experience with multi-party democracy and representative
government. Some areas which reflect particularly serious
problems are the judiciary and the media. There would be even
more serious problems in the area of drugs but for the tremendous
pressure and provision of resources from the United States.
The judiciary is extremely backward, is not independent, and
has a tremendous backlog of cases. This situation has received
international attention, in particular the tragic cases of
adoption by foreign parents. Large sums of money are involved,
17
and one of the two judges handling these cases was forced out in
August 1991. In late 1991 there was only one judge processing
adoptions and a conseguent great backlog of cases. The courts
have also been criticized by the Catholic Church and others for
not prosecuting Stroessner cronies for alleged corruption.
In general terms the media is free, though there remains a
certain amount of self-censorship. In contrast to the old
regime, respectable newspapers are allowed to circulate; ABC
Color and Ultima Hora are probably the most reputable. There are
two television networks and forty-six radio stations. Overall,
the media reports on whatever it chooses, and is very critical of
all branches of government.
The media, and in particular ABC Color , has focused
attention on Paraguay's endemic corruption. They have
highlighted corruption in the judiciary, economic institutions,
the civil registry, and the lawlessness in the important towns of
Ciudad del Este and Pedro Juan Caballero. Due to their coverage
there is a common perception that corruption has increased since
the coup. The government has stated its intention to wipe it
out, and President Rodriguez has in fact removed military
officers and officials in the Central Bank and the state
monopolies.
In 1991, however, there have been a number of attacks on
freedom of the media, and the most serious is related to
attention to corruption. In early March an ABC Color journalist
was shot at by a soldier at a clandestine airfield owned by the
18
former mayor of Ciudad del Este near the border with Brazil.
Later in the month another from the same paper was shot at by the
military when inspecting General Stroessner's vacated residence,
and was then arrested. In late April a journalist who had been
denouncing smuggling involving high-level officials was killed in
Pedro Juan Caballero. In September 1991, a humorist was
sentenced to pay a large fine and go to prison for four months,
for criticizing a member of the Council of State. And, a high
level Army officer, General Lino Oviedo, suggested that a
draconian press law be implemented to domesticate the media.
These may be simply reactions to press freedom that was unheard
of under the old regime, but elements in the media are concerned
about the tense relations with the military and Colorado leaders.
The media also highlight the divisions among the Colorados and
are happy to call attention to the personal attacks (oral and
physical) by the party's members on one another. This
undoubtedly has not helped the Colorados at the polls. The
Colorados then blame the media for highlighting their internal
problems.
Foreign Relations
It seems likely that the political transition in Paraguay
would not have gone so far and fast without the international
support which is both offered and solicited. Before the 1989
coup Paraguay was an international pariah, maintaining close
19
relations with only Brazil, South Africa, and Taiwan. Foreign
states and international organizations make concerted efforts to
include and integrate Paraguay into a wide variety of systems
with the intention to consolidate a democratic regime, develop
the country, and discourage smuggling, particularly in drugs.
The inauguration of President Rodriguez in May 1989 was
attended by the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, a
great many foreign ministers, and President Bush's daughter,
Dorothy. Vice President Quayle visited Paraguay in March 1990.
After the first direct municipal elections in May, President
Rodriguez received letters of congratulations from Presidents
Bush, Menem of Argentina, and Lacalle of Uruguay. President
Rodriguez attended the inaugurations of Presidents Collor, Menem,
Lacalle, Aylwin of Chile, and Paz Zamora of Bolivia. By August
1991, King Juan Carlos and Queen Sophia of Spain, and seven Latin
American heads of state had visited. In turn, President
Rodriguez had visited ten nations. In June 1990 he made an
unofficial visit to Washington and met with President Bush.
Paraguay hosted the twentieth OAS General Assembly in 1989.
After beginning its integration in the MERCOSUR in August 1990,
Paraguay joined the Rio Group in October 1990. The Treaty of
Asuncion with Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay to establish a
Southern Cone common market by 1995, the MERCOSUR, was signed in
mid-1991. One significant element in the MERCOSUR is the
requirement that the members must be democratic. 17
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As part of Paraguay's opening to the world, and the world to
it, is the intention to establish relations with what used to be
termed the Eastern Bloc. Until recently Paraguay had diplomatic
relations with only Yugoslavia. Paraguay is in the process of
discussing establishing relations with Hungary, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. In August 1991 the foreign ministry announced
that there were plans to establish diplomatic relations with
Poland, though neither country would establish missions in the
other country. There are ongoing visits and discussions on trade
with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Ambassador to Argentina met
with President Rodrigues in mid-July to promote trade. In late
July the Foreign Minister, Alexis Frutos Vaesken, accounced that
commercial and consular relations would be established with Cuba.
Relations with the United States are extremely good. After
serious delays and some concern by Paraguay, the GSP was restored
in February and the OPIC in July 1991. In the all-important (at
least for the United States) anti-drug effort, Paraguay is
extremely cooperative. The government has established an anti-
drug police Direccion Nacional de Narcoticos (DINAR) and a
special joint task force of military and police, the Servicio
Nacional Antidroqas (National Antidrug Secretariat - SENAD)
,
which in May 1991 replaced CONAD with expanded powers for the
Executive Secretary. SENAD is under the command of an anti-drug
czar, General David Marcial Samaniego. General Samaniego has
powers to demand cooperation from other government agencies, and
his office is responsible for coordination and oversight of all
21
counterdrug policy. In May 1991 the government was able to have
a law passed requiring banks and other financial institutions to
report transactions of over $10,000.
The United States does have a number of relatively small
assistance program with Paraguay. There is a USAID office in
Asuncion and a program of approximately $2 million in 1991 which
includes among its goals the strengthening of democratic
institutions and the promotion of economic reforms. Under the
State Department's International Narcotics Matters, Paraguay
received $300,000 in 1991 for various training requirements,
cooperative programs, and purchasing dogs. There is no security
assistance program, but there was $175,000 in FY-91 for
International Military Education and Training. In addition, the
United States and Paraguayan military train jointly in a number
of exercises. There are approximately 180 Peace Corps volunteers
also working in Paraguay. Through USAID, the military liaison
group, and various drug enforcement efforts, the involvement in
Paraguay is larger than might appear from the relatively small
sums of funds noted above. And, if the situation continues to
evolve along the same lines in Paraguayan politics and reforms,
in the context of the movement of drugs from Bolivia and Peru,
involvement could conceivably increase.
If official relations are extremely good, some elements in
the Colorado Party are critical of the role of the United States.
In February, Luis Maria Argana, leader of the Autonomous
Traditionalists, charged that the Embassy was working to remove
22
18the Colorado Party from government. When Ambassador Glassman
presented his credentials in early August 1991, virtually all the
daily newspapers gave it front page attention. Patria , the paper
of the Colorado Party, neglected the event and covered instead
the Ambassador of Egypt presenting his credentials. It should be
noted that relations between United States ambassadors, the
Stroessner government, and the Colorado Party were often tense
and difficult in a six-year period leading up to the coup.
President Rodriguez is attempting to redefine Paraguay's
relations with its neighbors. In addition to entering into
regional political and economic programs, he is seeking to
decrease the overwhelming reliance on Brazil, which General
Stroessner emphasized. The most obvious manifestation of the
reliance is the binational Itaipu complex where the final phase
of the huge dam complex was inaugurated by Presidents Collor and
Rodriguez in early May 1991. There is much pressure in Paraguay
to renegotiate the Itaipu Treaty, and the Congress voted
unanimously in August 1990 to request the president to begin
renegotiations. So far, however, President Rodriguez has pushed
primarily for Brazil to pay its overdue bills for electricity
sold by Paraguay from its share of the output. This was one of
the main topics of discussion during his official visit to
Brazil in late August 1991. As early as April President
Rodriguez stated that it was necessary to renegotiate the Itaipu
Treaty, but so far there has been little action and he has
apparently not been very forceful in his dealing with Brazil. 19
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Paraguay has ample reasons to want to renegotiate including the
following: 1. The established price is low, and even at that
Brazil has not been paying Paraguay; 2. There is a clause which
prohibits Paraguay from selling energy to other countries and
water has been allowed to run off that could have been used by
Paraguay to generate electricity to be sold to Argentina and
Uruguay; 3. And, the Itaipu Treaty consists of a treaty within
the MERCOSUR treaty, and according to some experts should be
superseded. 20 There are many other issues which complicate
renegotiation, including the 400,000 Brazilians living in Eastern
Paraguay, the illegal export of timber and other items to Brazil,
and the very close relations between the two militaries.
President Rodriguez has emphasized relations with Argentina,
which were largely neglected during the previous regime. Five
presidential meetings took place in 1989, and in 1990 there were
a series of meetings of businessmen from both countries, meetings
of border officials, and discussions regarding river usage and
land transportation. President Lacalle of Uruguay made an
official visit to Asuncion in May to emphasize cooperation in
MERCOSUR and to promote cooperation in counter-drugs and
business. It should be noted that members of other parties are
normally involved in the international relations areas.
Presidents Rodriguez and Paz Zamorra have visited each other's
capitals, and there are discussions regarding transport and
communications in the Chaco area.
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In addition to much closer relations with neighbors, an
opening to Eastern Europe, and positive cooperation with the
United States, President Rodriguez has emphasized economic links
with Asia. Paraguay maintains relations with Taiwan, and in June
of 1990 he visited Taiwan and Korea. President Rodriguez has
been successful in obtaining assistance and investment from these
two countries as well as Japan. Overall, Paraguay has redefined
its relations with the outside world and is finding ample support
for the consolidation of democracy and economic development.
The Economy
The economic situation remains mixed. In its "Preliminary
Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990"
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean rated
Paraguay as the economic leader for the decade of the 1980' s,
with a 3% growth rate in GDP in 1990, an increase in export value
of 219% for the decade, and a relatively low debt service burden.
1 In an interview with the author, an economic expert who works
on Paraguay he stated: "It is the best-managed economy in Latin
America." 22 According to World Bank data, in 1990 the GDP grew
at 3.1%, the rate of inflation was 44%, and external public debt
had decreased to 33% of GDP (down from 44% in 1989 and 53% in
1987) . The government eliminated the multiple exchange rates in
February 1989, and there is now a single free-floating exchange
rate. Due to the 44% inflation rate in 1990 the nominal interest
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rate was increased substantially. This resulted in real interest
rates of approximately 6%. The rate of inflation will probably
be less than 20% in 1991. Taxes are very low in Paraguay,
somewhere around 11% of GDP. The result of these factors has
been a tremendous infusion of foreign exchange to approximately
$1 billion in reserves (up from $250 million in early 1989) .
The economic growth, low inflation, and ample reserves have
not led, however, to a renegotiation of Paraguay's external debt.
This is due both to internal bickering in the government and the
manner in which some of the debts were incurred. The inability
to settle with the banks has made it impossible so far for
Paraguay to negotiate a standby loan with the IMF, which would
then open up more possibilities with other public and private
lenders. This would be Paraguay's first IMF assistance in three
decades. In mid-1991, Paraguay was supposed to renegotiate $400
million (of a total foreign debt of about $1,690 billion).
Apparently corruption was involved in some of the international
loans with both Paraguayans and foreigners receiving very large
sums of money. The government wants them discounted. They are
seeking deals similar to their renegotiation with Brazil. In
that case the $400 million owed was paid with devalued Brazilian
currency worth $130 million, but for which Paraguay received full
credit. Paraguay is seeking a similar arrangement with banks in
Italy, France, and possibly Spain.
In theory and fact the Paraguay economy is heavily
liberalized. There are no controls on exchange rates,
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repatriation of capital, and few controls on labor relations.
The borders are open. The financial system is being reformed and
the investment incentive law has worked reasonably well with
little corruption. Efforts to privatize state firms, however,
have made no progress. Not a single state firm has been
privatized despite an awareness that INC, National Cement
Industry, and APAL, the Paraguayan Alcohol Administration, are
likely candidates. In fact in 1991, the government created
FERTIPA, a state fertilizer firm. And PETROPAR, the state firm
with a monopoly on the import of crude oil, is expanding into
exploration.
Due to a number of problems including adverse weather, a
glut of cotton, and economic problems in neighboring countries,
Paraguay has a likely $300 million trade deficit in 1991. A
factor in this is also the inability of Brazil to pay for
electricity from the Itaipu complex.
Overall, however, the economy performed well, though one
must be careful of too much enthusiasm. It is estimated by some
that the contraband sector accounts for 30%-40% of total
commercial activity, and major reforms have yet to be made in the
tax and financial systems.
Conclusion
In 1990-91 Paraguay under the leadership of President
Rodriguez made substantial progress towards democratic
consolidation. Despite the atomization of the Colorado Party and
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its apparent inability to serve as a governing party in a
democratic system, political reforms were implemented and free
elections held. Reforms in the economic area have been slower
and in social matters even less impressive. The international
support for democracy and development has been strong, at least
in rhetoric and diplomatic terms, and Paraguay is rapidly moving
away from the isolation of the latter Stroessner years. As
Paraguay begins to formulate a new constitution it remains to be
seen whether it is able to avoid the long drawn-out process that
paralyzed Brazil in 1986-87.
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Notes
1. In addition to utilization of secondary materials and documents
made available through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) , I made a one week research trip to Asuncion in September
1991.
2. FBIS , South America, 3 February 1989, p. 28.
3. Paraguay is receiving considerably more attention in the United
States than in the past. During the past year at least two books
on contemporary politics were published and a major international
conference on Paraguay was held. See Carlos R. Miranda, The
Stroessner Era: Authoritarian Rule in Paraguay (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1990) and Riordan Roett and Richard Scott Sacks, Paraguay:
The Personalist Legacy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) . The
conference on "The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay: Problems
and Prospects" was held at the Kellogg Institute, University of
Notre Dame, 7-9 December, 1990.
4. Other compositions and names could be noted but these were the
sectors running in the party's election on 29 September for
representatives to the constituent assembly elections on 1 December
1991. ABC Color 29 September 1991. It should be noted that
President Rodriguez decreed that leaders of what was the militant
faction cannot participate in politics until after 1993. FBIS 5
February, 1991, p. 28. For a historical overview of the factions,
a discussion of membership, and a description of their tendencies,
see Benjamin Arditi, "Del Granito al Archipelago. El Partido
Colorado Sin Stroessner." A paper prepared for the Kellogg
Conference, December, 1990.
5. FBIS 15 July, 1991, p. 55.
6. FBIS 3 April, 1991, p. 32.
7. For a review of the liberals and febreristas, their programs
and tendencies, see Esteban Caballero Carrizosa, "Los partidos
politicos de oposicion en el actual processo de transicion en el
Paraguay: el caso del Partido Liberal Radical Autentico" prepared
for the Kellogg conference, December, 1990.
8. FBIS , 5 June, 1991, p. 41.
9. For the results of the second round see FBIS . 25 June, 1991, p.
28.
10. FBIS , 29 May, 1991, p. 39. For comments by Colorado leader Luis
Maria Argana see FBIS . 30 May, 1991, p. 39.
11. Earlier in the year a prominent leader of the Autonomous
traditional faction, Dr. Oscar Facundo Ynsfran, advocated military
rule to avoid Apolitical convulsion'. President Rodriguez and
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politicians from other factions and parties denounced the
suggestion. FBIS 8 February, 1991, p. 27 and 13 February, 1991,
pp. 23-25.
12. See for example the long interview on precisely these topics
with the Minister of Defense, General Souto, in FBIS 12 July, 1991,
pp. 31-34.
13. Carlos Maria Lezcano and Carlos Martini, "Intervencion Politica
de Las Fuerzas Armadas Despues del Golpe del 2 y 3 de Febrero en
el Paraguay." A paper prepared for the Kellogg conference,
December 1990, p. 20. For examples of business activities see pp.
27-31. See also Marcial Antonio Riqueleme, "Desde el Stronismo
hacia la Transicion: El Papel del Actor Militar." A paper prepared
for the Kellogg conference, December 1990.
14. Roberto Luis Cespedes Ruffinelli, "Sindicalismo y Transicion"
Paper prepared for the Kellogg conference, December 1990.
15. For an overview of rural organizing see Daniel Campos, "El
Movimiento Campesino ante la Crisis y la Nueva Coyuntura:
x Stronismo sin Stroessner 1 o Transicion Democratica. " Paper
prepared for the Kellogg conference, December 1990.
16. Foreign Minister Alexis Frutos Vaesken, for example, agreed
with the findings of a report on human rights by the Latin American
Human Rights Association. He welcomed the criticisms for the
improvement they could make. FBIS 15 April, 1991, p. 37.
17. For excellent overviews of Paraguay's international relations
see Fernando Masi, "Paraguay en el Proceso de Integracion del Cono
Sur" Instituto Paraguayo para la Integracion de America Latina,
Asuncion, August 1990, and "Paraguay: Hasta Cuando la x Diplomacia
Presidencialista'?" Forthoming, Anuario Prospel
.
1990-91.
18. FBIS 4 February, 1991, p. 39.
19. On his statement see FBIS 15 April, 1991. P. 37.
20. Fernando Masi, "Paraguay: Hasta Cuando la x Diplomacia
presidencialista'?" p. 8.
21. "Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the
Caribbean, 1990" ECLAC, Santiago, Chile 1991.
22. Interview in Washington, D. C. at multinational agency on 3
September 1991.
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